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0.  Abstract 
Part is not a univocal term. Uses of parthood and composition that do not obey any supplementation 
principle have a long philosophical tradition and strong support from contemporary physics. We call 
such uses potential parts. This paper first shows why potential parts are important and incompatible 
with supplementation, then provides a formal mereology for such parts inspired by the path-integral 
approach to quantum electrodynamics. 
1. An Introduction to Potential Parts 
 Parthood may not be a univocal relation. Cotnoir and Varzi (forthcoming, p. 13) give these 
examples of ordinary language parthood talk: 
(1) The handle is part of the mug. 
(2) The speaker is a part of the stereo system. 
(3) This half is your part of the cake. 
(4) The cutlery is part of the tableware. 
(5) This pile is part of the trash. 
(6) The circle is part of the area. 
(7) The vertices are part of the boundary. 
(8) The bombing was part of the attack. 
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Cotnoir and Varzi’s examples all plausibly meet Westerhoff (2004)’s condition that parts must be 
spatio-temporal and/or the unique results of a hypothetical decomposition.1 Whether or not such a 
concept of parthood can be literally extended to abstract objects, it can at least be metaphorically 
extended to cover them, and following Kit Fine (2010) we can call that entire extended notion 
integral parthood. Here Fine is following the scholastic tradition, which distinguished various kinds of 
integral parthood coordinated with a disjunctive answer to Peter Van Inwagen (1995)’s Special 
Composition Question (SCQ).2 Aquinas has his own technical term for these disjunctive answers to 
the SCQ, ‘relations of order,’ and summarizes the kinds of integral parthood as follows (1947, Q. 90, 
art. 3, ad 3): 
All integral parts have a certain relation of order to one another: but some are only related 
as to position, whether in sequence as the parts of an army, or by contact, as the parts of a 
heap, or by being fitted together, as the parts of a house, or by continuation, as the parts of 
a line; while some are related, in addition, as to power, as the parts of an animal, the first of 
which is the heart, the others in a certain order being dependent on one another: and thirdly 
some are related in the order of time: as the parts of time and movement. 
These seem to cover (at least approximately) everything on Cotnoir and Varzi’s list. Aquinas says that 
what is distinctive about such integral parts is that ‘the whole is not present in each of the parts, 
either as to its entire power, or as to its entire essence, but that it is present to all of them together 
at the same time’ (1947, Q. 90, art. 3, co.). Without getting mired in the details of powers and 
essences,3 we can say that this distinctness of the parts is what makes them hypothetically 
decomposable from the whole. Since they are decomposable, they must be composed in virtue of 
something, and this at-least-metaphorical spatio-temporal connection is what Aquinas refers to as a 
relation of order.4  
 Nonetheless the concept of integral parthood does not exhaust the ways in which we speak 
of parts. David Lewis’s assertion that ‘There is no sense in which my parents are part of me, and no 
                                                          
1 Following the direction of Varzi (2007), one might regard Westerhoff’s condition as just an informal 
statement of supplementation. 
2 For explanation of why the SCQ might admit of such disjunctive answers, see Hawley (2006). 
3 Though Sattig (2019) gives an accounting of how parthood and essence might be related. 
4 For more on the at-least-metaphorical connection here, see Wallace (2019). 
3 
 
sense in which two numbers are part of their greatest common factor’ (1986) did not prevent Amy 
Tan from summarizing her book The Joy Luck Club by saying that ‘my mother is a part of me’ (Pastor, 
2014), nor did it prevent Aristotle from saying that ‘two is called in a sense a part of three’ (1984a, 
V.25.1023b14). While Amy Tan may have been speaking metaphorically, Aristotle was not, instead 
allowing that two is in some sense not a part of three only because two is not a factor of three 
(Kretzmann, 1976). The scholastics attempted to meet these non-integral notions of parthood by 
offering two further options: subjective parts and potential parts. Subjective parts were an attempt 
to do justice to Aristotle’s invocation of genus and species as parts of each other in Metaphysics 
V.25, and we need not quibble here with Lewis’s contention that mereological language sheds little 
light on our intuitions about universals (1986). Potential parts, meanwhile, are cases where ‘the 
whole is present, as to the entire essence, in each’ (Aquinas, 1947, Q. 90, art. 3, co.).  
 The Thomistic view of potential parthood is much stronger than the mereology of potential 
parts given by Canavotto and Giordani (forthcoming). Canavotto and Giordani treat any non-
heaplike structured sum (e.g. a completed puzzle)—what Fine (1994) calls compounds—as a 
potential whole. Pieces in a puzzle (Canavotto and Giordani’s stock examples of potential parts) may 
not be actually separated in space, but they have actually separate existence; the essence of each 
piece is not the same as the essence of the whole puzzle. For Aquinas, by contrast, the difference 
between heaps/aggregates and structured sums/Fine’s compounds is a difference between two 
integral parthood relations with different relations of order. Relative to integral parthood, potential 
parthood can seem like a confused notion: 
Potential wholes are curious items. They are particulars, not universals. Yet potential wholes 
are not composed out of their parts in the way that, for example, a house is composed out 
of bricks and wood. Indeed, the most commonly discussed kind of potential whole is a soul, 
and since souls are forms and forms are mereologically simple, they ought to be 
mereologically simple. That Boethius (following Aristotle) asserts that souls have parts is 
therefore initially quite puzzling (Arlig, 2015). 
Of course to say that potential wholes have potential parts is precisely to say that they are not 
mereologically simple absolutely speaking; they are mereologically simple only in their lack of spato-
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temporal integral parts like puzzle pieces and bricks. Obviously these are meant to be two very 
different notions of parthood.  
  Potential parts in this strong sense have a pedigree beyond Aquinas and an importance 
beyond scholastic disputations about the soul. The idea of potential parthood goes back at least to 
Aristotle’s rejection of the Empedoclean conception that elements come-to-be out of a mixture as ‘a 
stone and a brick both come-to-be out of a wall—viz. each out of a different place or part’ (1984b, 
II.7.334b1). In fairness to Lewis and Westerhoff’s intuitions, Aristotle calls this ‘combination’ 
(σύνθεσις) as opposed to ‘composition’ (μίξις) where ‘the constituents are preserved in small 
particles’ (1984b, I.10.328a6-9). Nonetheless Aristotle uses the word part (μέρος) in just the way 
Aquinas defined as potential, averring that ‘if combination has taken place, the compound must be 
uniform—any part of such a compound being the same as the whole’ in its essence (1984b, 
I.10.328a10-11). As such, the elemental constituents with their distinct essences cannot ‘persist 
actually’ in a mixture, but ‘nor are they destroyed’—they rather exist ‘potentially’ (Aristotle, 1984b, 
I.10.327b23-30). This means that while mixtures ‘are homogeneous homoeomeries’ where ‘every 
part is the same as the whole,’ nonetheless ‘what is mixed must have the potential to reemerge 
from the mixt’ and ‘the change involved in mixture is not total or complete’ such that the elements 
continue to play an explanatory role in the properties of the mixture (Wood & Weisberg, 2004). 
Aristotle’s elements in a mixture must be potential parts in a stronger sense than Canavotto and 
Giordani’s puzzle pieces. Each puzzle piece certainly comes-to-be a detached or independent entity 
from a different place upon removal from the sum, even when that sum is structured as a completed 
puzzle. Similarly, each puzzle piece still actually exists as a piece when it is placed into the structured 
sum of the completed puzzle, even though it is no longer detached.  
 Furthermore, the physical applications of potential parthood are not purely antiquarian. 
Wood and Weisberg (2004) suggest that Aristotle’s concerns about mixtures are of enduring 
importance for the metaphysics of modern chemistry. More broadly, Ladyman and Ross claim that 
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the ‘metaphysics of domestication’ which ‘seeks to account for the world as “made of” myriad “little 
things” in roughly the way that (some) walls are made of bricks’ is ‘profoundly unscientific’ (2007, p. 
5). If we are to preserve mereology’s present importance in science (Calosi & Graziani, 2014), we 
should provide a clear model of non-integral parthood. 
2. The Physical Motivation for Potential Parts 
 Rather than attempting to address the broad questions of Wood and Weisberg or the 
sweeping claims of Ladyman and Ross, I will focus on a single case where scientific use of 
mereological terms requires a radically potential notion of parthood: 
So, suppose that there is a unique proton. Since a proton is constituted by two up quarks 
and one down quark held together by the strong interaction, we construe the proton as an 
actual entity composed by three potential proper parts (Canavotto & Giordani, 
forthcoming). 
Many current undergraduate physics texts (e.g. Serway et al., 2008, p. 4; Rosen, 2009, p. 133; Rex & 
Wolfson, 2010, p. 622) do discuss protons and other hadrons as being composed of quarks.5 Writing 
a more advanced undergraduate text, Michel Le Bellac (2011, p. 6) explains why these cannot be 
understood as ordinary integral parts: 
The crucial point is that these particles [the proton decay products] do not exist ab initio 
inside the proton, but are created at the instant the [decay] reaction occurs. It therefore 
appears that at some point it is not possible to decompose matter into constituents which 
are more and more elementary…the current idea is that a particle is elementary if it behaves 
as a point particle in its interactions with other particles. According to this idea, the electron, 
neutrino, and photon are elementary, while the proton and neutron are not: they are 
‘composed’ of quarks. These quotation marks are important, because quarks do not exist as 
free states, and the quark ‘composition’ of the proton is very different from the proton and 
neutron composition of the deuteron. Only indirect (but convincing) evidence of this quark 
composition exists. 
                                                          
5 As Calosi (2018) suggests, even such simple and common statements do rely on controverted assumptions 
about how to interpret the quantum formalism, and (at-least moderate) scientific realism generally. This paper 
does not argue for those assumptions, but rather seeks to read such common scientific claims charitably, and 
asks what notion of parthood might apply if we take them seriously. Certainly a defender of the analyticity of 
supplementation for parthood could simply deny the relevant realist and interpretive assumptions, but this is a 
substantial cost for a mereological view to bear. 
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Given Canavotto and Giordani’s definition of potential parts as entities that exist in structured sums, 
they interpret ‘free’ with respect to quarks in the same way as ‘separate’ with respect to puzzle 
pieces. The actual distinction between free and bound states, however, is that:  
Once nucleons are bound to a nucleus, energy-momentum conservation applies to the 
nucleus as a whole and the momenta of a pair of nucleons inside a nucleus are no longer 
restricted by [the conservation laws]. Interaction between two nucleons is ‘off the energy 
shell,’ or off-shell for short…if the sum of the momenta squared is not constrained by the 
kinetic energy of their relative motion (Wong, 1998, p. 100). 
Bound quarks are thus always off-shell (Yndurain, 2007, p. 267), and the light quarks which make up 
protons are never free, so they are always off-shell (Grozin, 2005, p. 78). Such off-shell particles are 
called virtual because they can be given no realistic interpretation (Bunge, 1970; Fox, 2008): they 
represent non-local behavior (Schmidt-Böcking et al., 2005) and both their number and species are 
indeterminate (Weingard, 1982; French & Krause, 2006, p. 360). Quarks are clearly not integral parts 
of protons, since a proton’s spatio-temporal footprint cannot be assigned among its quark 
constituents, and any hypothetical decomposition of the proton does not result in a set number of 
quarks of each species. 
 Nonetheless we should not abandon the idea that quarks are in some sense parts of 
protons, since the idea is connected to no less than four Nobel Prizes in physics. The 1943 prize was 
given to Otto Stern for his discovery that protons are not magnetically uniform, indicating that they 
are not point particles and charge is not distributed uniformly throughout their extension. Richard 
Hofstadter (1956)’s refinement of this result earned him the prize in 1961. These results count 
sharply against any account of protons as mereologically simple. Murray Gell-Mann (1964) proposed 
that treating hadrons as composed of quarks would explain the observed symmetries, for which he 
received the prize in 1969. Following theoretical work by Richard Feynman, Jerome Friedman, Henry 
Kendall, and Richard Taylor received the 1990 Nobel Prize for showing that patterns in the deep 
inelastic scattering of electrons by protons were best explained by point-like localization of those 
quarks (Riordan, 1992). These results are not disconsonant with Le Bellac’s caution, however, since 
the point-like localization of quarks is only observed in deep inelastic scattering, which is a proton 
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decay reaction. Yet it is unsurprising that physicists speak of protons as composed of quarks if 
protons are not mereologically simple and quarks help to explain their properties. 
 Physicists deal with this tension by treating protons ‘as a superposition of states with 
different, but fixed, number of partons [quarks and bosons]’ (Chýla, 2009, p. 91). Each of these basis 
states is treated as a possible configuration of the proton, and a distribution function assigns the 
properties of the proton (e.g. its charge and mass-energy) across the particles which make up the 
basis state, in accordance with the known properties of each type of particle and the conservation 
laws. Since the basis state can hypothetically be decomposed into the number of particles of each 
species which compose it, and those particles are spatio-temporal (they each have an assigned 
momentum, though subject to the usual quantum constraints), it is reasonable to treat those 
particles as ordinary integral parts of the basis state. This does not make the particles which 
compose the basis state integral parts of the proton, however, since each basis state, on its own, has 
the full mass-energy, charge, and magnetic moment of the proton. 
 The ‘standard shorthand’ that a proton is composed of ‘two up quarks and one down quark’ 
means that each and every basis state ‘has two more up quarks than up antiquarks, and one more 
down quark than down antiquarks’ (Strassler, 2011). These unpaired quarks are known as the 
valence quarks because their contributions to the proton’s ‘quantum numbers like charge, baryon 
number, isospin, and strangeness’ are not canceled out by corresponding antiquarks (Bugg, 2012, p. 
4). Physicists reasonably use the language of parthood to discuss the explanatory contribution of 
valence quarks, especially since that contribution is spatially non-uniform, yet while the same 
species of valence quarks may be present in each basis state, nothing about the formalism allows us 
to treat them as literally the same particles.  
  One way forward is to engineer the concept of identity, as in French and Krause (2006). As 
French and Krause admit, however, no mereology has yet been developed which is compatible with 
their revised identity concept (2006, p. 278). Why develop a new concept of identity and new 
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mereology, however, when new mereology on its own is sufficient? The mereological approach is 
suggested by physicists’ practice, which often models the proton by assigning the contributions of 
the other partons to the valence quarks, known as dressing them into so-called constituent quarks, 
which are not standalone elementary particles (Povh et al., 2015, p. 223). This makes the constituent 
quarks integral parts of the proton, but at the cost of requiring that the constituent quarks 
themselves be composed of an indefinite number and species of particles. These can again be tamed 
by treating them as a superposition of basis sets, each of which has a fixed number and species of 
particles, but again those basis sets cannot be integral parts, since each on its own has the full mass-
energy, charge, and magnetic moment of the constituent quark. Protons are not well treated as 
simples, since they have non-uniform extension, but their mereological complexity cannot be 
exhausted by integral parts.6 
 These issues are most sharply apparent in quantum chromodynamics (QCD) because models 
which treat hadrons as straightforwardly composed of their valence quarks have ‘failed almost 
completely and given no predictions [of detailed properties] which have been verified by 
experiment’ (Lipkin, 1983).7 As Friedman, Kendall, and Taylor’s 1990 Nobel Prize citation suggests, 
however, there is a profound analogy between QCD and quantum electrodynamics (QED) (The Royal 
Swedish Academy of Sciences, 1990). Sin-Itiro Tomonaga, Julian Schwinger, and Richard Feynman 
developed the dressing method in QED (for which they received the 1965 Nobel Prize) in order to 
explain an anomaly in the hydrogen microwave spectrum discovered by Willis Lamb (for which he 
received the 1955 Nobel Prize). Dressed particles are thus necessary in both QCD and QED, and in 
both cases they involve compositions of an indefinite number and species of particles (Bugg, 2012, p. 
4). Taking composition-talk in physics seriously requires giving an account of parthood for dressed 
                                                          
6 Models which treat protons as extended simples or composed of integral parts might be useful idealizations 
in certain contexts, but they are inconsistent models which are both inadequate to the full range of contexts. 
They are thus best treated as idealizations of Weisberg (2007)’s third kind, which are useful but do not reveal 
the true structure. 
7 In fact, the ‘straightforwardly composed’ or free quark model works precisely when the quarks are taken to 
have infinite momentum (Chýla, 2009, p. 92), when by the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle it would have 
infinitely uncertain position, and thus again cannot be an integral part.  
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particles, which cannot be done with the integral concept of parthood, which assumes that 
decomposition is spatio-temporal and unique. 
3. A Model for Potential Parts  
3.1 Informal Semantics: Dressed Electron Propagator as Mereological Model 
 A model of potential parts which responds to these motivations must give as much familiar 
mereological structure as possible without supplementation. Supplementation guarantees the 
distinctness of parts, allowing a whole to have a unique decomposition. By contrast, if overlap is 
total, then parts will avoid the spatio-temporal distinctness of bricks in a wall.8 Potential parts must 
be unified into a whole not by some relation (like contact or functional integration), which would 
presume their distinctness, but by some shared essence which each possesses in its entirety. 
 Feynman’s path integral formulation of quantum mechanics (2010), provides the tools to 
build a mereological model which meets these constraints. In Feynman’s formulation the results of 
the familiar double-slit diffraction experiment are construed as electrons propagating through space 
by taking every possible path which satisfies the boundary conditions—the measured locations at 
the beginning and end of the paths (Zinn-Justin, 2005, pp. v, 35). The electron does not actually take 
every path (it is always in just one place when measured and otherwise would violate the 
conservation laws which govern the propagation of particles in space), yet the actual path, until 
measured, is a superposition of all the possible paths (Fox, 2008). Each possible path for an electron 
in weakly interacting fields can be given a heuristic representation as a Feynman diagram with a 
different interior topology but the same entering and exiting particles. Adding up all the 
contributions represented by the various Feynman diagrams is done by dressing the bare propagator 
to yield the effective (dressed) propagator (Carr, 2009, p. 71). This is the same dressing process that 
explains the Lamb shift in the hydrogen spectrum and the quark composition of the proton. Each 
                                                          
8 If supplementation holds, then when bricks are separated from a wall certain bricks have privileged relations 
to certain portions of the wall, namely those portions which they have as spatio-temporal parts that other 
bricks do not. 
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Feynman diagram represents a basis set, with the particles shown in the diagram as integral parts of 
that basis set, and the dressed propagator as a potential whole which is in a superposition of all the 
basis sets. When the dressed propagator is an electron, we should treat it as an ontologically serious 
entity, because electrons are among the strongest candidates for microphysical realism (Putnam, 
1975). The other particles in the basis sets represented by the Feynman diagrams, however, cannot 
be integral parts of the electron because the best current experimental research indicates that 
electrons are truly elementary particles, lacking substructure (Brodsky & Drell, 1980) and hence 
integrally simple. Since the dressed propagator thereby shares its essence (actual entering and 
exiting particles) equally with all its possible realizations, which are not themselves actual but 
contribute to its actuality, the operation of summing Feynman diagrams can be taken as a model for 
mereological summing of potential parts.9 Feynman diagrams can also be written for quarks and 
other partons in quantum chromodynamics (Chýla, 2009, p. 206), but they are considerably more 
complicated and have received less topological study. 
3.2 Formal Semantics: A Join Semi-Lattice 
 The formal contribution of this paper is to generate a mathematical structure suitable for 
mereological semantics from the basis sets which compose a single dressed electron propagator in 
QED under the Standard Model (the formal results are given in bold). Each basis set is represented 
by a lawfully constructed Feynman diagram, and the rules for constructing Feynman diagrams in 
Standard Model QED are straightforward (Tanedo, 2010): 
1. You can draw two kinds of lines, a straight line with an arrow or a wiggly line: You can draw 
these pointing in any direction. 
2. You may only connect these lines if you have two lines with arrows meeting a single wiggly 
line. Note that the orientation of the arrows is important! You must have exactly one arrow 
going into the vertex and exactly one arrow coming out. 
3. Your diagram should only contain connected pieces. That is every line must connect to at 
least one vertex. There shouldn’t be any disconnected part of the diagram. 
                                                          
9 Further apparatus is required, however, for this mereological summation to match the quantitative 
summation done by physicists: no mereological account has been given of why higher-order perturbations 
have decreasing contributions to the whole. 
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We need only consider the topologically distinct diagrams yielded by these rules (Carr, 2009, p. 44). 
For a single dressed electron propagator, these rules yield the following valid topological moves 
(called perturbations) to generate increasingly complex Feynman diagrams (Carr, 2009, p. 49): 
 At zeroth order (no loops), the bare electron propagator (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: The Bare Electron Propagator 
 At first order (one loop) and above: 
o the Hartree term (Figure 2).10 
 
Figure 2: The Hartree Term 
o the Fock term (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: The Fock Term 
                                                          
10 The two arrows on the loop are an unfortunate artifact of the standard Feynman diagram generation 
software. More careful treatments use a single arrow to indicate that there is only one fermion line. 
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 At second order (two loops) and above, the fermionic bubble, or polarization loop, which 
does not exist at first order because there is no photonic line to interrupt with a fermionic 
loop (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: The Polarization Loop 
Repeated applications of these topological moves yield 10 second-order diagrams (Figure 5), 74 
third-order diagrams (Figure 6) and 706 fourth-order diagrams beyond the single zeroth-order and 
two first order diagrams (Prunotto et al., 2018). 
 
Figure 5: Generating the diagrams through second order by application of Hartree terms (solid), Fock terms (dashed), and 
Polarization Loops (dotted). Distinct series of perturbations often yield topologically identical results. 
 
Figure 6: The diagrams through third order arranged as a join semi-lattice. 
Prunotto, Alberico, and Czerski (2018) reproduce all of the second and third-order diagrams. 
Because each perturbation introduces new segments to which one of the topological moves can be 
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applied, these moves can be repeated infinitely, and in fact such infinite-order perturbations are 
often physically important (Carr, 2009, p. 37).  
 The Feynman diagrams for the electron propagator in Standard Model QED (and the basis 
sets they represent) therefore have a natural weak partial-ordering on the perturbation relation. 
Perturbation, construed as a binary relation between Feynman diagrams, is interpreted to mean that 
one diagram can be generated from another by valid topological moves. Since every dressed 
propagator has a zeroth-order bare propagator with the same topology, doing nothing is clearly a 
valid topological move which we can count as a trivial instance of perturbation, making the 
perturbation relation reflexive. Since all three non-trivial perturbations raise the order of the 
diagram (and no perturbation lowers the order of a diagram), perturbations which change the 
diagram can never restore it, so perturbation is anti-symmetric. Because valid moves are valid 
regardless of order, the perturbation relation is transitive.11 The whole poset of Feynman diagrams 
and corresponding basis sets is generated by applying perturbation to the zeroth-order term, so that 
diagram is the top or 1. Since the poset has a top, every subset has a least upper bound or 
supremum, and by anti-symmetry that least upper bound is unique (Partee et al., 1993, p. 278). 
Because the supremum always exists, the poset is a join semilattice, even though join is slightly 
tricky to interpret since perturbation does not have a well-defined inverse by which one can remove 
perturbations from a Feynman diagram.12 We will say that the join of two diagrams (and 
corresponding basis sets) x and y is the highest-order diagram from which both can be generated by 
perturbation. Because this structure is relatively similar to the classical mereological model for 
integral parts (see Cotnoir & Varzi, forthcoming, p. 35), we can meaningfully interpret parthood 
                                                          
11 This does not imply that a single perturbation (a single valid topological move) is transitive, but rather the 
general operation of perturbation, by which a higher-order Feynman diagram is generated from a lower order 
one by a series of valid topological moves. 
12 If removal of perturbations from Feynman diagrams were well defined, the dual of this structure would be a 
junky meet semilattice of the integral topological parts of Feynman diagrams. The zeroth-order propagator 
would be the bottom, or nucleus, a part of every other diagram. These topological parts of diagrams would be 
integral parts in accord with Westerhoff (2004) because they are clearly spatial and, if their removal were well 
defined, the diagrams would be uniquely decomposable into them. 
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within it, saying that diagram x is part of diagram y just in case y can generate x by perturbation. The 
zeroth-order diagram has all of the others as parts, so it is the universe. As perturbation can 
continue infinitely, potential parts are gunky. This gunky join semilattice serves as a formal 
semantics for the model of potential parts. 
3.3 Syntax: Mereological Axioms for Potential Parts 
 We have seen from the formal semantics of the proposed model that potential parts satisfy 
the ordering axioms of classical mereology. The classical definitions of proper parthood, overlap, 
underlap, and disjointness likewise require no modification. The proposed model for potential parts, 
however, cannot follow the classical axiomatization for decomposition. The classical remainder 
axiom and its less strict alternatives of strong and weak supplementation all entail that in cases 
where x is a proper part of y there must be some other part disjoint with x (Cotnoir & Varzi, 
forthcoming, pp. 25, 104, 111). In this model, however, all objects overlap because the various 
perturbations can be performed in any order and in an infinite sequence every order will occur, so 
there are no disjoint parts. This paper’s proposed model for potential parts is thus the pyramid 
model (Figure 5) from Cotnoir and Varzi that they deem mereologically incredible (forthcoming, pp. 
127–128).  
 
Figure 7: An extensional model that validates Strong Company but not Supplementation 
This partial ordering cannot be considered as a genuine configuration of integral parts precisely 
because it is the configuration of potential parts, and both are not parts in the same sense. The 
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appropriate decomposition axiom for this model is thus what Cotnoir and Varzi call strong 
company—for all x and y, if y is a proper part of x, then there exists a further part which is a proper 
part of x and not a part of y (forthcoming, p. 125).13 Strong company is satisfied by potential parts 
since there are multiple non-trivial perturbations of any given diagram which each generate a 
different diagram of immediately higher order (distinct proper parts), and by anti-symmetry these 
diagrams of the same order are not parts of each other. Cotnoir and Varzi worry that models which 
satisfy strong company but where ‘weak supplementation fails at every level of decomposition’ are 
problematic because ‘the removal of any proper part, at any level, will result in the annihilation of 
the wholes’ (forthcoming, p. 127).14 In this model of potential parts, however, such annihilation has a 
physical meaning: according to QED, an electron just is the particle which allows these 
perturbations, so if one of the perturbations is impossible, then that particle fails to exist. Despite 
using such a weak decomposition principle, however, no two distinct wholes have the same proper 
potential parts, because two diagrams which allow the same perturbations are topologically 
identical, so the model satisfies extensionality of proper parthood (see Cotnoir & Varzi, 
forthcoming, p. 27). 
4. Conclusions About Potential Parts 
 Potential parthood finds natural applications in areas of science where composition seems 
to occur but Westerhoff (2004)’s condition that parts must be spatio-temporal and/or the unique 
results of a hypothetical decomposition is not met, so parthood cannot be understood in the usual 
integral way. The dressed electron propagator in the Standard Model of QED is a natural model for 
such a parthood relation, and it yields an extensional mereology with the classical ordering axioms 
and strong company as its decomposition axiom. This provides a much more natural reason to reject 
the analytic truth of weak supplementation than Smith (2009)’s approach, which relies on combining 
                                                          
13 Cotnoir and Varzi credit this nomenclature to Varzi (2007). Bynoe (2011) calls it “non-parthood 
supplementation” and defines it as “For all kinds of parthood, if y is a part of x then there’s something, z, such 
that (1) z is a part of x, (2) z isn’t a part of y, (3) z isn’t y.” 
14 Cotnoir (2018) characterizes this as a failure of the intuitive ‘outstripping’ conception of proper parthood. 
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time-travel thought experiments with a denial of extensionality. At both informal and formal levels, 
we have reason to regard integral and possible parts as different kinds of parts. Distinguishing these 
kinds of parts can avoid several difficulties for understanding QED that Passon et. al. (2019) trace to 
the misconception that virtual particles are ordinary, actual parts. Moreover, potential parthood 
need not be regarded as merely a recondite notion from scholastic faculty psychology.  
 This model of potential parthood provides a meaningful semantics for the claim that protons 
are composed of quarks. If those quarks are understood as elementary particles, then those particles 
are integral parts of basis sets, and those basis sets are in turn potential parts of protons. If those 
quarks are understood as dressed constituent quarks, then they are integral parts of protons, and 
have the basis sets represented by their perturbed Feynman diagrams as potential parts, which are 
in turn composed by elementary quarks and gluons as integral parts. Both possible readings of the 
quark composition of protons rely on the distinction between integral and potential parts. 
 A side benefit of such an account is that it may help to make peace among competing 
mereological intuitions. Those who do not share Ted Sider (1993)’s intuition that gunky integral parts 
are possible may nonetheless accept gunky potential parts. This, in turn, allows one to share 
Jonathan Schaffer (2003)’s wish for non-hierarchical levels of reality without embracing gunky 
integral parts in the actual world. On the other hand, those who deny proper integral parthood 
entirely, whether for mereological nihilism (e.g. Unger, 1979) or mereological anti-realism (e.g. 
Cowling, 2014) may nonetheless be able to accommodate some composition intuitions if they can be 
framed in terms of potential parts. Similarly, defenders of extended simples (e.g. Markosian, 1998; 
Simons, 2004; McDaniel, 2007) will have another distinction to wield. 
 Nonetheless there is further work to be done. Since potential wholes can be integral parts, a 
formal account should be given of how potential parthood in this sense interacts with the sense of 
parthood given in Canavotto and Giordani (forthcoming). Since quantum mechanics can be modelled 
with possible worlds rather than virtual particles, an account should be given of where and how this 
17 
 
differs from the modal account of parthood given by Cotnoir (2013). There is also further work to be 
done in applying the model. One of the traditional applications of mereology is relating the masses 
of wholes to the masses of their parts (Cotnoir & Varzi, forthcoming, p. 76). Since dressing fermion 
propagators with only those higher-order diagrams that ‘cannot be split into two by breaking a 
single fermion line’ yields the self-energy, or mass, of the particle (Carr, 2009), bringing this 
distinction into the model would allow a mereological account of mass grounded on scientific rather 
than folk physics. 
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